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GANGS OF NEW YORK ARE TERRORISTS?
THE MISAPPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK
ANTITERRORISM STATUTE DUE TO THE
LACK OF COMPREHENSIVE GANG
LEGISLATION
CHANTAL TORTOROLI
INTRODUCTION

On August 18, 2002, friends and family gathered for a
baptism party in a church hall on McGraw Avenue in the Bronx,
New York.' Several members of the St. James Boys, a Mexican
gang, were attending, including twenty-year-old Edgar Morales
and gang leader Alejandro "Alex" Solis.2 During the festivities,
Morales and his fellow gang member, Enrique Sanchez,
confronted Javier Tocchimani, whom they believed to be a
member of a rival gang, the Vagabondos 3 As tensions escalated,
the group made its way out of the hall.4 Soon a fight erupted,
and the gang members fired shot.5 A bullet hit Javier Tocchimai,
paralyzing him. 6 Tragically, a stray bullet also struck the head of
an innocent bystander, ten-year-old Melanny Mendez, killing her

J.D. Candidate, 2010, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2005, McGill
University.
1 See Press Release, Robert T. Johnson, Dist. Attorney, Bronx Dist. Attorney's

Office, Gang Member Found Guilty in the Death of a Ten-Year-Old Girl-Jury
Finds Fatal Shooting Was a Crime of Terrorism (October 31, 2007),
http://bronxda.nyc.gov/information/2007/case59.htm
[hereinafter Bronx District
Attorney, October 31, 2007].
2 See id.; see also Sean Gardiner, Gangbangeras 'Terrorist. A 9/11 Anti-Terror
Law Turns out To Be Handy Against Small-Time Hoods, VILLAGE VOICE, June 27,
2007, at 11.
I See Bronx District Attorney, October 31, 2007, supra note 1; see also Denise
Buffa, Terror Test in Bx. Kill--9/11 Law Used on Gang, N.Y. POST, May 21, 2007, at
21.
4 See Bronx District Attorney, October 31, 2007, supra note 1.
' See id.
6 Id.
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instantly. 7 Over eighteen gang members were charged in
connection with Melanny's death, but most, including gang
leader Solis, fled to Mexico. 8
Edgar Morales, one of the gang members involved in the
fight that day, was tried and convicted as a terrorist in a New
York court. 9 Morales was charged with manslaughter in the
first degree 0 for the girl's death, attempted murder in the
second degree 1 for the shooting of Javier Tocchimai, criminal
possession of a weapon in the second degree, 2 and conspiracy in
the second degree. 13 A Bronx jury found that all four of these
offenses had been committed with the "intent to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population" and, as such, they were "crime[s] of
terrorism" under the New York Antiterrorism Act of 2001.14 The
characterization of the crimes as acts of terrorism enhanced the
punishment for each crime.15
Morales was sentenced as a
terrorist to two consecutive prison terms of twenty years to life.' 6
This Note argues that the New York antiterrorism statute
should not have been applied to a Mexican gang member in the
Bronx given the differences in the typical motive and scope
between terrorism and gang violence. The misapplication of the
New York antiterrorism statute by the prosecutors in the
case against Morales highlights two deficiencies in the current
New York Penal Code: an overly broad antiterrorism statute
and a lack of comprehensive gang statutes. The lack of gang
statutes in New York, particularly those that allow for sentence
See id.

7

See Gardiner, supra note 2.
See Timothy Williams, In Bronx Murder Case, Use of New Terrorism Statute
Fuels Debate, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2006, at B1 [hereinafter Williams, New Terrorism
Statute]; see also Timothy Williams, Bronx: Man Sentenced for Killing Girl, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2007, at B7 [hereinafter Williams, Bronx Man Sentenced].
8

10N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (McKinney 2010).
11Id. §§ 110.00, 125.25.
12

Id. § 265.03.

13 Id.

§ 105.15. See generally Bronx District Attorney, October 31, 2007, supra

note 1.
14 Timothy Williams, New York's Post-9/ 11 Terrorism Law Is Used To Convict a
Bronx Gang Member in a Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2007, at B1; see also N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 490.25.
15 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25(2).
16 Press Release, Robert T. Johnson, Dist. Attorney, Bronx Dist. Attorney's
Office, Life Imprisonment for Gang Member Convicted of Manslaughter and
Attempted Murder as Crimes of Terrorism (Dec. 10, 2007), http://bronxda.nyc.

gov/information/2007/case66.htm
2007].

[hereinafter Bronx District Attorney, Dec. 10,
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enhancement, and the vague language of the statute inspired
prosecutors in the Bronx to improperly turn to a statute that was
never intended to combat gang violence.
Part I of this Note details the background of the New York
antiterrorism statute. It explains the relevant legislative history,
as well as the structure and wording of the statute. Part II
explores the controversial application of the New York
antiterrorism statute to a gang member in the Bronx, setting out
the arguments for and against its application, made by the Bronx
District Attorney's Office and Morales, respectively.
Part III argues that the statute was inappropriately applied
against a New York City gang member, an application which was
permissible due to vague terms within the statute. By clarifying
certain vague terms, such as "civilian population," and including
other limiting phrases, the New York legislature could avoid
similar misapplications in the future. Specifically, this Note
recommends a new standard for defining an act of terrorism:
political terrorism, in which the act of terrorism must be
politically motivated and international in scope. This political
terrorism standard will effectively exclude all local criminals,
specifically gang members.
Lastly, Part IV recommends that the New York legislature
create gang statues that address the prevalence of gang violence
in New York State.
The surprising lack of gang statutes
available to law enforcement officials has encouraged prosecutors
to attempt to remedy the situation by using several different
statutes, including New York's antiterrorism statute.
I.

A.

THE NEW YORK ANTITERRORISM STATUTE: BACKGROUND

Legislative History and Intent

The New York Antiterrorism Act of 2001 was enacted in
direct response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon. With these attacks, terrorism
became a palpable, personal fear for citizens throughout the
United States; passions ran high and feelings of helplessness
were pervasive. The federal government immediately responded
to this national sentiment with antiterrorism legislation created
to improve and strengthen its policies regarding terrorism.17 At
"7See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2006).
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the same time, many state legislatures enacted antiterrorism
statutes to deal directly with the threat of terrorism at a local
18
level.
New York was first to enact an antiterrorism statute-a
mere six days after 9/11, on September 17, 2001.19 Immediately
after 9/11, Governor Pataki called a special session of the state
legislature to enact a comprehensive package of antiterrorism
laws. 2' By September 13, 2001, the New York State legislators
had signed a resolution that condemned terrorism. 21 A few days
later, the New York legislature passed the Antiterrorism Act of
2001 with minimal opposition.2 2 Legislators believed that this
statute would create a powerful tool for prosecutors against
terrorists.2 3
After examining the legislative history of the statute, it is
clear that the creation of the statute was rushed. Its proposal
and enactment occurred less than one week after September 11,
2001.24 There was strong support for the statute, with very little

I See Donna Lyons, States Enact New Terrorism Crimes and Penalties, NCSL
ST. LEGIS. REP. (Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Denver, Colo.) Nov. 2002, at
1, available at httpJ/www.ncsl.orgfPortals/l/documents/cj/terrorismcrimes.pdf. At
least thirty-three states have enacted antiterrorism statutes, including Virginia and
Ohio. Id.; see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.4 (2009); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2909.24 (West 2009). See generally Tasia E. McIntyre, Note, Protecting Against
Terrorism or Symbolic Politics?: Fatal Flaws in Ohio's Criminal Terrorism Statute,
56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203 (2005) (giving a detailed analysis of the Ohio
antiterrorism statute as applied to a school shooter on campus at Case Western
Reserve University).
19 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 490.00-.35.
20 Press Release, George Pataki, Governor of N.Y., Governor Calls Special
Session To Enact Antiterrorism Law (Sept. 16, 2001), http'//old.911digitalarchive.
org/crr/documents/1087.pdf.
21 N.Y.S., N.Y.A., J. Res., 224th Sess. (2001), available at http://news.findlaw
.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/nylegres9l30l.pdf.
22 See Voting List: Senate Bill S70002, reprinted in NYLS LEGIS. HIST., 2001, at
ch. 300. On September 17, 2001, the New York State Senate voted 53 to 1 in favor of
the antiterrorism statute and the New York State Assembly voted 131 to 6 to
approve the statute. See id.
' Memorandum in Support, ch. 300, L. 2001, reprinted in NYLS LEGIS. HIST.,
2001, at ch. 300. In the following years, however, there was a distinct lack of
prosecutions under this statute. Joel Stashenko, Prosecutor's Make Widened Use of
Terror Threat Law, N.Y. L.J., June 4, 2007, at 1.
24 See Stashenko, supra note 23 (quoting Senator Thomas Duane, a Democrat
Assemblyman from Manhattan, as saying "We legislated in haste"); Press Release
from Governor George Pataki, supra note 20; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 490.00.35.
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debate over its enactment or wording.2 5 The desire to enact
legislation as soon as possible was seen as important.2 6
The legislative history of the statute reveals that political
and idealistic motivations as the defining characteristics of
terrorism.
The Resolution passed on September 13, 2001,
described the terrorist attack that had occurred two days earlier,
stated that New York needed protection from similar attacks
against the "very principles of American freedom," and that those
who "attempt to destroy our most sacred ideals and threaten the
peace of our State and Nation will be found and brought to
justice."2 7
Moreover, this resolution provided that "[tihe
devastating consequences of the recent, barbaric attack on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon underscore the compelling
need for legislation that is specifically designed to combat the
evils of terrorism."2 8
Additionally, the Governor's Program Bill Memorandum,
containing the original form of the statute, was specifically
designed to establish criminal penalties for persons who commit
25 See Press Release, WTC Response Update: Federal, State & City Officials
Express Support for Antiterrorism Package, (Sept. 17, 2001), reprinted in NYLS
LEGIS. HIST., 2001, at ch. 300. There was strong support on many different fronts.
For example, the New York State Director of Criminal Justice Katherine N. Lapp
said, "[The antiterrorism statute] will provide critical investigative tools to assist
law enforcement officials and prosecutors.. .. " Id. New York City Police
Commissioner Bernard B. Kerik also expressed "full support" for the bill. Id. There
were, however, a few vocal dissenters to the bill. Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver,
Democrat from Manhattan, described the antiterrorism statute "over-kill [sic],"
expressing doubt that it would ever actually be used and admitting that he had
voted for the statute more as a show of solidarity in a time of crisis rather than for
its practical purposes. John Caher, State LegislatureApproves Tough Anti-Terrorism
Laws, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 18, 2001, at 1.
26 See Memorandum from the New York Civil Liberties Union ("NYCLU"),
Statement in Opposition to Anti-Terrorism Legislation Now Pending in New York
State Legislature (Mar. 12, 2003), http'J/www.nyclu.org/node/658 ("In place of a
reasoned explication of the substantive issues in the legislation, there were demands
for urgent action, in the face of national emergency."). The NYCLU stressed that it
did not support the antiterrorism statute package and, instead, urged that there be
bipartisan hearings to permit a rigorous and searching inquiry into the appropriate
response for New York State to the threat of terrorism, but this was rejected. See id.
("Requests for clarification [of language] were interpreted as both dangerous and
disloyal.").
27 N.Y.S.,
N.Y.A., J. Res., 224th Sess. (2001), available at http'J/news
.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/nylegres9l3Ol.pdf. This joint resolution has a
small preamble in which it condemns and details the terrorist attacks of September
11th. See id.
2 Memorandum in Support, ch. 300, L. 2001, reprinted in NYLS LEGIS. HIST.,
2001, at ch. 300; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.00 (containing the same language).
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terrorist acts, make terrorist threats, or render assistance to
terrorists in New York State.2 9 The Bill Memorandum provided
that
[a] comprehensive state law is thus urgently needed in New
York to complement federal counter terrorist efforts and
eliminate terrorism, while bringing terrorists and their
supporters to justice. The bill enacts fundamental reforms and
sends a powerful message that New York
will do everything
30
possible to wipe out the evils of terrorism.
Former New York State Senator Michael Balboni, a
Republican from Mineola, New York, sponsored this document.3
Senator Balboni explained that when he sponsored this statute,
he envisioned an act of terrorism to have a "mass effect," such as
instances of terrorism like the World Trade Center attack and
the Oklahoma City Bombing.2 Other New York Senators have
echoed this sentiment, stating that the statute should include Al
Qaeda-like terrorism but not ordinary, local crimes.3
The examples of past terrorist attacks provided in the
"Legislative Findings" section of the statute bolster the view that
the statute focuses on combating politically motivated terrorist
attacks.34 Specifically, it states "that terrorism is a serious and
deadly problem" in the United States and describes the need for
laws that facilitate the prosecution and punishment of terrorists
in state courts to better protect all citizens against terrorist
acts. It gives specific examples of terrorism that fall within
the intended scope of the statute: the bombings of American
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the bombing of the
federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, the attack on Pan Am
29 Governor's Program Bill Memorandum No. 60, reprinted in 2001 N.Y. ST.
LEGIS. ANN. 170-72. Governor Pataki explained that the New York legislature
needed to send a clear message to potential terrorists that New Yorkers would not
be intimidated and that they had every intention of fighting back. See Pataki, supra
note 20. His wording indicates that terrorists are not New Yorkers; therefore, it
follows that they must be international or subnational actors. See id.
30 Memorandum in Support, ch. 300, L. 2001, reprinted in 2001 McKinney's
Session Law News of N.Y., WL NY-LEGIS-OLD LEG MEMO 300.
"1See Williams, supra note 14. Balboni is now in private practice working on
homeland security issues. See Joel Stashenko, Criminal Justice Chief To Lead
Homeland Security, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 27, 2009, at 1.
32 Williams, New Terrorism Statute, supra note 9.
3 See id. Assemblyman Jeffrey Dinowitz, a Bronx Democrat, who voted for the
bill stated: "We were talking about Osama bin Laden, not gang members." Id.
3 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.00 (McKinney 2010).

35 Id.
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Flight 103 in Lockerbie in 1998, the 1997 shooting atop the
Empire State building, the 1994 murder of Ari Halberstam on
the Brooklyn Bridge, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade
Center, and "the recent 3barbaric
attack on the World Trade
6
Center and the Pentagon."
An unusual example given in the statute is the murder of Ari
Halberstam, a sixteen-year-old Jewish boy, killed by a Muslim
3
shooter on the Brooklyn Bridge7.
At first glance, this act
seems to be a local crime; however, it contains an important
international aspect: The shooter, a foreigner, was motivated by
revenge for an international occurrence-the massacre of
Muslims by a Brooklyn-born Jewish settler on the West Bank
that occurred one week prior to his attack. 3 Therefore, like the
other examples, the crime committed by the defendant was
related to anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist, or anti-American motives,
which reach beyond the single act of murder, and the crime was
motivated by the desire to intimidate others from supporting the
39
same political position as the victims.
B.

The Text of the Statute

The New York antiterrorism statute created new criminal
offenses for terrorism, including (1) soliciting or providing
support for an act of terrorism in the second degree,4 °
(2) soliciting or providing support for an act of terrorism in the

36

Id.

V George James, Bridge Gunman Gets 141-Year Term, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
1995, at B3. The shooter was Rashid Baz, a twenty-eight-year-old Lebanese
immigrant who was convicted of firing a hail of bullets into a van of Hasidic
students. Id.; see also Francis X. Clines, Brooklyn Bridge Shooting; Suspect Arrested
in Shooting of Hasidim, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1994, at Al.
' See James, supra note 37 (explaining that the crime had important
international aspects).
39 See Respondent's Brief, Office of the Bronx District Attorney, at 10, People v.
Morales, No. 2210/2004 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) [hereinafter Resp't Br.]. But see
Greenberg & Yurowitz, supra note 23, at 1.
40 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.10 (McKinney 2010). This crime occurs
[wihen, with intent that material support or resources will be used, in
whole or in part, to plan, prepare, carry out or aid in either an act of
terrorism or the concealment of, or an escape from, an act of terrorism, he
or she raises, solicits, collects or provides material support or resources.
Id. There is minimum amount of money required, and it is punishable as a Class D
violent felony imposing a sentence of up to seven years in state prison. Id.; see also
Greenberg & Yurowitz, supra note 23.
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first degree,4 ' (3) making a terrorist threat,4 2 (4) committing the
crime of terrorism,4 3 (5) hindering prosecution of terrorism in the
second degree,' and (6) hindering prosecution of terrorism in the
first degree.45 Of the six crimes within the statute, the crime of
terrorism is unique and will, therefore, be the focus of this Note. 6
Terrorism, as defined by the Act, is not a new substantive
crime, but rather is a sentence enhancer, which increases the
possible punishment for the underlying predicate offenses
already codified within the New York Penal Code. The statute
provides that a crime of terrorism occurs when a person, "with
intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the
policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or
affect the conduct of a unit of government by murder,
assassination or kidnapping... commits a specified offense.

41 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.15. This statute contains the same language as the
crime in the second degree; however, the amount of monetary support must be in
excess of $1,000. Id. It is punishable as a Class C violent felony, and imposes a
sentence of up to fifteen years in state prison. Id.; see also Greenberg & Yurowitz,
supra note 23.
42 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.20. This statute provides that
[a] person is guilty of making a terroristic threat when with intent to
intimate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a unit of
government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a unit of
government by murder, assassination or kidnapping, he or she threatens to
commit or cause to be committed a specified offense and thereby causes a
reasonable expectation or fear of the imminent commission of such offense.
Id. § 490.20(1). This provision also provides that it is "no defense to a prosecution
pursuant to this section that the defendant did not have the intent or capability of
committing the specified offense or that the threat was not made to a person who
was a subject thereof." Id. § 490.20(2). This crime shall be punishable as a Class D
violent felony, and imposes a sentence of up to seven years in state prison. Id.; see
also Greenberg & Yurowitz, supra note 23.
4 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 490.25.
4 Id. § 490.30. This provision provides that a person is guilty of this crime
"when he or she renders criminal assistance to a person who has committed an act of
terrorism, knowing or believing that such person engaged in conduct constituting an
act of terrorism." Id. A person may be charged with this crime regardless of whether
the act of terrorism resulted in the death of another person. It is punishable as a
Class C violent felony offense, imposing a sentence of up to fifteen years in state
prison. Id.; see also Greenberg & Yurowitz, supra note 23.
45 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 490.35. This statute contains similar language as
hindering prosecution in the second degree, but the act of terrorism must result in
the death of another. Id. This is punishable as a Class B violent felony offense, id.,
imposing a sentence of up to twenty-five years in state prison. Id. § 70.00(2)(b); see
also Greenberg & Yurowitz, supra note 23.
1 See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25.
47 Id. § 490.25(1).
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If the underlying crime fits within the definition of the crime
of terrorism, the crime will be considered, for sentencing
purposes, to fall within a category higher than the actual crime
For example, if a defendant is
that the defendant committed.'
convicted of a crime of terrorism, and the underlying special
offense was a Class B felony, it will be deemed a violent felony
offense, and therefore, a Class A-I felony.49 Thus, a defendant
will be subject to the possibility of a more severe punishment
than would normally be applicable for his or her crime. 50
Terrorism, as defined in the Act, includes certain phrases
that are further defined in the definition section, such as an "act
of terrorism" and a "specified offense."5 1 An "act of terrorism" is
defined as
an act or acts constituting a specified offense ... for which a

person may be convicted in the criminal courts of this
state ... that is intended to: (i) intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) influence the policy of a unit of government by
a unit of
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) affect the conduct of
52
government by murder, assassination or kidnapping.
A "specified offense" is defined as a Class A felony offense-a
violent felony offense defined in section 70.02 of the Penal Law,
including manslaughter, criminal tampering, identity theft,

' Id. § 490.25; see Greenberg & Yurowitz, supra note 23 (describing sentencing
for the crime of terrorism).
49 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25; see also id. § 70.00.
'o See id. § 70.00. In cases where the predicate specified offense is already a
Class A-I felony, the most serious class of felony, the statute punishes the conduct
with lifetime imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id. § 490.25(2)(d). This
statute was created when capital punishment was lawful in New York. See People v.
LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88, 817 N.E.2d 341, 783 N.Y.S.2d 845 (2004) (holding that New
York State's death penalty statute violated the state's constitution). Therefore, the
defendant convicted of murder in the first degree for a crime of terrorism is no longer
eligible for the death penalty-even though the statute does not preclude it. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 490.25(2)(d); see also Greenberg & Yurowitz, supra note 23 (describing
the sentencing provision for each crime under the statute).
"' See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.05. Another important definition
in
the
statute
is
"material
support
or
for
other
provisions
resources." This is defined as "currency or other financial securities, financial
services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious
materials." Id. § 490.05(2).
52 Id. § 490.05(1)(a) (emphasis added); see also Greenberg & Yurowitz, supra
note 23 (explaining that the definition of an act of terrorism for this New York
statute was taken from earlier federal statutes and federal case law).
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unlawful possession of personal identification information, or
money laundering, and it includes an attempt or conspiracy to
commit such offenses.5 3 A "specified offense" does not include an
offense defined in article 220 (which are drug offenses).5 4 Several
key phrases, however, such as "intimidate," "coerce," and
"civilian population," are not defined.55
II.

THE NEW YORK ANTITERRORISM STATUTE:
APPLICATION V. INTENT

Despite the rushed enactment and the sense of an urgent
need for an antiterrorism statute after September 11, the New
York statute remained unused for years. It was not until 2007,
in the case against Morales, that the statute was used at all.56
The Bronx District Attorney turned to the New York
antiterrorism statute as a possible weapon against gang violence.
As discussed previously, the definition of "an act of terrorism"
under the New York statute is a "specified offense," which is
intended to: "(i) intimidate or coerce a civilian population,
(ii) influence the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or
coercion, or (iii) affect the conduct of a unit of government by
3 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.05(3)(a). Section 70.02 defines a violent felony offense
as any Class B, C, D, or E violent felony offense. Id. § 70.02. Specified offenses do not
include offenses in section 490.37-criminal possession of a chemical weapon or
biological weapon in the third degree; section 490.40-criminal possession of a
chemical weapon or biological weapon in the second degree; section 490.45-criminal
possession of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the first degree; section
490.47-criminal use of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the third degree;
section 490.50-criminal use of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the
second degree; or section 490.55-criminal use of a chemical weapon or biological
weapon in the first degree. See id. § 490.05(3)(b).
Id. § 490.05.
5 See id.
See Williams, New Terrorism Statute, supra note 9. To this day, New York's
Antiterrorism statute has never been used against political terror attacks, such as
attempts or threats to bring down the government. See Stashenko, supra note 24.
Meanwhile, in other states, prosecutors have had limited success using their
antiterrorism statutes against local criminals. In Virginia, the antiterrorism statute
was used successfully in a case against a serial sniper shooter who targeted his
victims randomly in several states in the Washington, D.C. area. See generally
Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 619 S.E.2d 16, 24, 34-38 (Va. 2005). The court held
that the defendant, the man who orchestrated the shootings, committed acts of
terrorism under the statute, which has similar wording to the New York statute. See
id. at 37; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.4 (2009). The Ohio antiterrorism statute
was used against a school shooter at Case Western Reserve University in
Cleveland-though the charge of terrorism was later dropped. See McIntyre, supra
note 18, at 203-04 & n.11.
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murder, assassination or kidnapping." 7 This Note focuses on the
language of the first subsection of the definition, "intimidate or
coerce a civilian population," the crime for which gang member
Edgar Morales was charged.
"UnanticipatedApplication"8 : The New York Antiterrorism
Statute Applied to a Mexican Gang Member in the Bronx

A.

Edgar Morales is a member of the St. James Boys, a group of
one hundred recreational soccer players who formed a street
gang of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in the West Bronx.5 9
The St. James Boys is a local gang that does not carry out drug
sales or run prostitution or gambling rings; the sole purpose of
the gang is to enhance its own power and status in its small
Mexican community in the West Bronx. 60 Edgar Morales was
present the day a gang fight erupted at a baptism in 2002, a fight
that lead to the death of an innocent young girl.61 For this crime,
nineteen members of the St. James Boys were charged with
terrorism; however, some reached plea deals with the District
Edgar
Attorney's Office and others fled back to Mexico. 62
Morales, a former construction worker, was the only member of
the St. James Boys who went to trial.6 3
Morales was arrested four days after the shooting, charged
with criminal trespassing and tampering with physical evidence,
and served eleven months in jail. 64 He was also charged with the
murder of the young girl at the baptism after Enrique Sanchez, a
fellow member of the St. James Gang who was present the day of
the killing, pleaded guilty and became a cooperating witness.6 5
Morales was convicted of four acts of terrorism, and, as a
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.05(1)(a); see supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
58 Senator Balboni said that Bronx District Attorney Johnson's use of the statute
was an "unanticipated application" but refused to say whether he supported the use
against gang members. Williams, New Terrorism Statute, supra note 9.
59 See id. At trial, a member of the St. James Boys testified that the purpose of
their existence was to be the most feared of all Mexican gangs. Bronx District
Attorney, Dec. 10, 2007, supra note 16.
60 See Williams, New Terrorism Statute, supra note 9.
61 See id.
62 See id.
7

6

See Gardiner, supra note 2.

6 Id.
6 Id.; see also Resp't Br., supra note 39, at 12 (explaining why the charges of
terrorism brought against Edgar Morales do not violate the principles of double
jeopardy for the crimes committed in August 2002).
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result, he was subject to enhanced sentencing for his underlying
crimes.6 6 He was sentenced on December 10, 2007, to two
consecutive prison terms of twenty years to life.67
B.

"Urban Terrorism"8 : A Textual Argument

Prior to the trial, the defendant, Morales, argued for
dismissal of the crime of terrorism charge, alleging that he
was denied his due process rights; he claimed that he could
not reasonably understand that his conduct fit within the
statute's prohibition.69
Morales argued that the concept of
terrorism should be limited to acts of political motivation,
commonly committed by international terrorist organizations,
and therefore, it was inappropriate for him to be convicted under
the statute.70
The Bronx District Attorney justified the use of the statute
against the local gang member by arguing that since the statute
is clear in the conduct it prohibits and since Morales's conduct
fits within the prohibited conduct, he could be charged as a
terrorist. 71
Moreover, the District Attorney supported his
unorthodox application of the statute by arguing that the statute
did not create any new prohibited behavior but merely enhanced
the punishment for already criminal conduct.7 2
The District Attorney argued that the behavior of the gang
fits squarely within the statutory language for two reasons.
First, the crimes Morales committed, including manslaughter
and possession of a weapon, were specified offenses within the
statute.8 Second, the gang members committed these specified

66See Bronx District Attorney, October 31, 2007, supra note 1.
67 Bronx District Attorney, Dec. 10, 2007, supra note 16.
6 See Resp't Br., supra note 39, at 3.
69See id. at 6-9. Morales also moved to dismiss on the grounds that the
prosecutor failed to properly instruct the grand jury as to some of the charges and on
the grounds that the charge equated to double jeopardy because he had already been
charged with other crimes relating to the incident. Id. at 1.
70 See id. at 2.
71 See id. at 2-3.
72See id. at 4-5. The District Attorney also responded to the argument that the
defendant raised with two other points: First, the statute is more than symbolic and,
second, the case against Morales is not double jeopardy. See id. at 2, 12. The double
jeopardy argument will not be discussed as it is beyond the scope of this Note.
13 See id. at 4-5.
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offenses with the intent "to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population," thereby placing their actions under the statutory
definition of a crime of terrorism.74
Morales, however, argued that the phrase "to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population" is unconstitutionally vague, and
consequently, he was not on notice that he committed a crime of
terrorism.75 The District Attorney responded that the words
"intimidate" and "coerce" are common words, and applying
principals of statutory construction-since there is no definition
within the statute-the words should be given their ordinary and
everyday meanings.

The definition of intimidate is to make

timid or fearful.77 Coerce has several common definitions: to
restrain or dominate by force, to compel to an act or choice, and
to achieve by force or threat.78
Applying these common meanings, the Bronx District
Attorney argued that the St. James Boys "intimidated" and
"coerced" those living in the Bronx. 9 At the time of the
conviction, the St. James Boys was one of the most aggressive
and violent Mexican gangs in the Bronx. 0 During the trial,
Detective James Shanahan of the NYPD's Bronx Gang Unit
testified about the St. James Boys' violent actions in the Bronx
over the years, including a description of how they had fired
shots into a crowd of Mexicans who were on their way to a
birthday at a hall in St. Nicholas of Tolentine Church on
February 21, 2004.81 The gang enacted a systemic campaign of
intimidation in which members preyed upon law-abiding citizens
of Mexican origin.82 Morales, however, argued that the gang's
74 See Bronx District Attorney, Oct. 31, 2007, supra note 1. District Attorney
Johnson declared that the "terror perpetrated by organized gangs ... also fits
squarely within the scope of this statute." Id.
75 See Resp't Br., supra note 39, at 6. However, Morales failed to provide
examples of phrases in other statutes that have previously been determined to be
improperly vague, as the District Attorney argued. Id.
76 Id. at 6-7; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 5.00 (McKinney 2010) ("[Tlhe provisions
herein must be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote
justice and effect the objects of the law.").
77 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 656 (11th ed. 2007).
78 See id. at 240.

19Resp't Br., supra note 39, at 6-9.
80 See Bronx District Attorney, October 31, 2007, supra note 1.
81 See id.

82 See, e.g., Williams, New Terrorism Statute, supra note 9. At Morales's trial,
the prosecution introduced evidence of at least nineteen specific prior acts of violence
committed by the gang members from 1999 to 2002 as a part of this pattern of

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:391

activities were not terrorism because they lacked the necessary
political and international motivations . 3 While the District
Attorney admitted that the motive for the gang's crimes was not
political, he insisted that the St. James Boys were "not 'common
street thugs'... [and w]hat they [were] engaging in [was],
indeed, terrorism."'
In addition to debating whether Morales's actions were done
with intent to intimidate or coerce, the prosecution and defense
argued over whether the target of the alleged intimidating and
coercion was a "civilian population" as required by the statute. 85
In the statute, the target of the act of terrorism is defined as a
"civilian population."8 6
Once again, there is no statutory
definition for this phrase. The Bronx District Attorney defined a
civilian population as "hard working, law abiding citizens,
including fellow immigrants from Mexico."87 This immigrant
Mexican population is restricted to a subsection of the Bronx; the
District Attorney seemed to argue that the smaller the civilian
population, the better fit for the statute.8 8 In contrast, the
defendant argued that attacks must be used to intimidate a
broader civilian population, such as the Jewish population or
Americans in general.89

III. THE NEW YORK ANTITERRORISM STATUTE SHOULD NOT
APPLY TO LOCAL GANG MEMBERS
The New York antiterrorism law was inappropriately
applied to a Mexican gang member in the Bronx for several
reasons. First, the statute is vague and its application to
violence. See Robert T. Johnson, Bronx District Attorney, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.
POST, Nov. 16, 2007, at 48. For example, gang members "robbed restaurant patrons,
fired shots into crowds, beat and harassed strangers and slashed rivals with knives."
See Williams, New TerrorismStatute, supra note 9.
'3See Resp't Br., supra note 39, at 2 ("As a basic premise, the defendant appears
to attempt to limit the concept of terrorism to acts of political motivation, commonly
committed by international terrorist organizations.").
4 Johnson, supra note 82.
8 See Resp't Br., supra note 39, at 9-11.
'6See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25 (McKinney 2010).
s Bronx District Attorney, October 31, 2007, supra note 1.
s See Resp't Br., supra note 39, at 11 ("But the evidence before the grand jury
defined an even smaller section of the population than [the entire population of
Bronx County]; the proof established that the victims of the defendants' actions,
specifically and exclusively, were Mexicans or Mexicans-Americans.").
89 See id. at 10-11 (arguing that the District Attorney's use of the phrase
"civilian population" was incorrect).
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Morales violated his due process rights.
Secondly, the
legislature, enacting this statute immediately after 9/11,
intended it to deal with international Al Qaeda-like terrorist
groups. Thus, local street crime, including gang violence, should
not fall within the reach of the statute. New York gang statutes
must adequately address the problem of gang related crimes, like
the crime that occurred in People v. Morales. This Note proposes
possible solutions for the overly broad New York antiterrorism
law by clarifiying the text to narrow the potential reach of the
statute to only politically motivated terrorism.
A.

New York Terrorism: A Vague Statutory Concept

The New York antiterrorism statute is overly broad, leading
to possible unconstitutional applications. Specifically, the phrase
"intimidate or coerce a civilian population" is vague because it
fails to clarify who constitutes a "civilian population"-the
required target in the first subsection of the definition of a crime
of terrorism.90 Thus the statute fails to provide notice sufficient
for an ordinary person to understand what conduct is prohibited.
Moreover, the vague statute creates the potential for arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.
The New York Penal Code does allow for broad
interpretations of its statutes, as explained in section 5.00, which
provides that "the general rule that a penal statute is to be
strictly construed does not apply to this chapter."9' However,
included in this provision is the caveat that the provisions herein
"must be construed according to the fair import of their terms to
promote justice and effects the objects of the law."92
"Civilian population" does not have a common, every day
meaning, which would be helpful when interpreting this phrase
to the "fair import" of its terms. 93 Thus, this statute fails to
90

See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25(1).

91 Id. § 5.00.

Id.
See id. Morales provided a New York case, People v. Bright, 71 N.Y.2d 376,
520 N.E.2d 1355, 536 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1988), as binding precedent for an
unconstitutionally vague statute. See Resp't Brief, supra note 39, at 5. This case
involved a loitering statute, section 240.35 of the Penal Law, which the court held
unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clauses of both the Federal
Constituiton and state constitution because the statute failed to give fair notice to
the ordinary citizen that the prohibited conduct was illegal; it lacked minimal
legislative guidelines, thereby permitting arbitrary enforcement; and, finally, it
92

93
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provide notice sufficient for ordinary people to understand what
conduct it prohibits.94 Nowhere in the New York antiterrorism
statute is the term "civilian population" defined.9 5 According to
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, "civilian" means "one
not on active duty in the armed services or not on a police or
firefighting force."96
However, the more troubling term in
this phrase is "population." According to Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary, population can mean anything from "the
total of individuals occupying an area or making up a whole" to
"the whole number of people or inhabitants in a country or
region.""
Therefore, when combined, the phrase "civilian
population" has no specific single size, composition, or definition.
The phrase "civilian population" can have different meanings
depending on different perspectives.9" A civilian population can
be all the people in New York City, just those who live in the
Bronx, or just those who live on a single block-it can even be
argued that a civilian population can be only two people. A
defendant may be unaware that his intended actions are
terrorism if he does not know that he has affected a "civilian
required that a citizen relinquish his constitutional right against compulsory selfdiscrimination to avoid arrest. Bright, 71 N.Y.2d at 378-79, 520 N.E.2d at 1356, 536
N.Y.S.2d at 68.
94See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999). This case provides an
example of a statute that was deemed unconstitutional because it was vague. It
involved the enactment of the "Gang Congregation Ordinance" by the Chicago City
Council, which prohibited criminal street gang members from loitering in a public
place. Id. at 45. The Supreme Court held that this statute was unconstitutionally
vague, violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the
statute lacked a clear definition of "loitering." Id. at 56-57; see also Reuven Young,
Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International
Law and Its Influence on Domestic Legislation, 29 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 23, 69
(2006) (explaining the importance of including a precise definition of what
constitutes unlawful conduct in an antiterrorism statute).
95See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.05.
9 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 77, at 226. The

civilian victims of the September 11 attacks are a good example and have been
described as "innocent in the commonly accepted sense that they were civilians
carrying out their day-to-day business without the intent to harm others." Hidemi
Suganami, Reflections on 11 September, in 11 SEPTEMBER 2001: WAR, TERROR AND

JUDGEMENT 3-4 (Btilent Gbkay & R.B.J. Walker eds., 2003) (emphasis added).
97 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 77, at 966.
98 See McIntyre, supra note 18, at 220-21 (explaining the lack of definition of
"civilian population" in the Ohio antiterrorism statute). "Therefore, absent clear
standards regarding the population to be considered, the civilian population affected
under the Ohio terrorism statute may constitute only two people, an entire town, the
county, the state, or maybe even the entire country." Id.
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population."9 9 Therefore, under the present language of the
statute, many criminals who commit "specified acts" could be
deemed terrorists, and thus be subject to enhanced sentencing
provisions without their knowledge.' 0 0
In addition to the lack of notice, a vague statute also creates
the possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by
A valid statute establishes
law enforcement officials. 1°1
minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement officials on the
correct application of the law; in the absence of minimum
guidelines, law enforcement and government officials can choose
whom to prosecute based on the accused's views and politics,
The New York
thus creating the possibility of abuse.0 2
antiterrorism statute fails to provide minimal guidelines for what
exactly can be construed as an act of terrorism because of the
lack of definition of a "civilian population," which leaves it up to
police, prosecutors, and juries to follow their own predilections
when defining the term however broadly or narrowly they
10 3
choose.
The possibility of arbitrary enforcement of the statute is
particularly problematic because an important feature of the
provision is sentence enhancement. 10 4 Prosecutors are able to use
this statute to enhance the sentence for ordinary local crimes
that involve "intimidation" or "coercion" of whatever "civilian
population" they see fit, diluting the definition of terrorism.
Therefore, even if the crime adequately fits under another
statute, the prosecutor can also attempt to apply the terrorism
statute to reach the maximum sentence possible.0 5 However, the
legislative purpose of the New York antiterrorism statute is to
9 Resp't Br., supra note 39, at 5. A narrow definition acts as a "gatekeeper" to
invasive police power, whereas a broader definition has the effect of conferring
greater powers on the police. See Young, supra note 94, at 70.
100 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 490.05, 490.25.
101 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 45 (5th ed. 2009).
102 See id. at 45-47.
- See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTiONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
942 (3d ed. 2006).
104 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25(2).
105 This could lead to potential prosecutorial abuse if the statute is applied for its
sentence enhancement and not because it is actually a valid crime of terrorism.
Robert Perry, the NYCLU legislative director, stated that "Extending th[e] authority
[of terrorism prosecutions] to local law-enforcement will almost certainly exacerbate
the injustice." Press Release, NYCLU, NYCLU Opposes State Terrorism
Legislation-Charging the Law Poses New Threat to Rights and Liberties (July 21,
2004) httpJ/www.nyclu.org/node/471.
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combat politically motivated terrorist attacks, similar to the
attacks on September 11. The context of the enactment of the
statute and the text of the statute reflect this intent and
demonstrate that this statute should not be used against local
criminals.
B.

Solutions for the New York Antiterrorism Statute

The statute needs to be amended to accurately reflect its
intended purpose-the punishment of political terrorists-and to
prevent the possibility of unjust application. To prevent future
misapplications of the statute and to bring it in line with its
intended purpose, textual clarifications are necessary. First, the
target in the first prong of an act of terrorism, a "civilian
population," must be clarified to prevent further unintended and
unconstitutional applications. °6 Second, an international aspect
must be added to the definition of an act of terrorism, which will
prevent the inclusion of local street crimes. Ultimately, an act of
terrorism should be an act of political terrorism-one in which
the ultimate target is the government and the actions are
international in scope. This new political, international standard
will reach Al Qaeda but exclude local street criminals, such as
gang members, murderers, and mobsters.
To focus the statute on political terrorism, the terms "to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population" must be clarified in
two ways. First, it must be clear that there is an ultimate
political goal in undertaking the acts against the civilian
population. Second, the civilian population must be defined in a
manner that reflects the legislative intent that the act target a
sufficiently broad range of people, not a small, specific
subsection.
The attack against the civilians must have a broader
political goal than terror for personal gain or terror in and of
itself. This Note discusses the vagueness of the first prong of the
definition, to "intimidate or coerce a civilian population." 0 v The
other two alternative prongs of the definition of crime of
terrorism avoid vagueness by having a political target and
motive in their definitions. The second prong provides that one
commits a crime of terrorism when one "influence[s] the policy of

106
107

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.05(1)(a)(i).

Id.
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a unit of government by intimidation or coercion" and the third is
when one "affect[s] the conduct of a unit of government by
murder, assassination or kidnapping." 0 8
Both are clearly
political in nature. Conversely, the first prong of the definition
uses the phrase "civilian population" as a target and does not
include any mention of a political motive or target."°9 Therefore,
this prong must include some reference to a political motive to
avoid misapplications of the statute, perhaps with the inclusion
of "a unit of government" as the ultimate target. Thus, a more
valid wording would provide that an act of terrorism is an act
intended to "intimidate or coerce a civilian population with the
intent to influence or affect a unit of government." This brings a
necessary political motive to the first prong of the definition of an
act of terrorism.
Additionally, the phrase "civilian population" must not be
construed to mean a very narrowly defined group of people,
which would allow for an overly broad application of the statute.
A "civilian population" cannot be a small subsection of a
community and cannot be too limited in terms of geography or
ethnicity.
Instead, the preferred definition of a civilian
population would be a "community rather than a narrowly
defined group of people," as defined by the Virginia Supreme
Court when applying its antiterrorism statute to a sniper
shooter.1 ° A community must be a large enough group of people
that the act of terrorism inflicts "mass violence" and has
psychological effects that go beyond a local, isolated incident."'
Finally, there must be an international aspect to the crime
committed; it must "transcend national boundaries in terms of

108

Id. § 490.05(1)(a)(ii)-(iii) (emphasis added).

'o
110

Id. § 490.05(1)(a)(i).

See Muhammad v. Virginia, 619 S.E.2d 16, 43 (Va. 2005). The court
interpreted the Virginia antiterrorism statute's intended target-"population at
larger-which is comparable to "civilian population" in the New York antiterrorism
statute. See id.
"' Donald Black, Terrorism as Social Control, in 5 TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM:

CRIMINOLOGICAL

PERSPECTIVES,

SOCIOLOGY

OF CRIME,

LAW

AND

DEVIANCE 9, 10 (Mathieu Deflem ed., 2004) (emphasis omitted). Brian Jenkins, a

political analyst, security counselor, and White House adviser, explains terror as
producing psychological effects far beyond the immediate physical damage by
saying, "One person's terrorist is everyone's terrorist." HARRY HENDERSON, GLOBAL
TERRORISM: THE COMPLETE REFERENCE GUIDE 4-5 (2001) (emphasis omitted).
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the means by which [the acts] are accomplished"11 2 or the actors
involved. This international aspect would be an important but
not a determinative, factor in classifying the defendant as a
terrorist.
Using a political standard in defining an act of terrorism
captures the terrorist's fundamental political aims: either to
overthrow or change dominant political systems."
Even if the
civilians are the immediate targets of violence, the ultimate
target is the nation's very existence." The New York legislature
recognized this when it described the 9/11 attacks, the catalyst
for creating the statute, as attacking "[tihe very principles of
American freedom" and attempting to destroy American's "most
sacred ideals" and "threaten the peace."11
Deeper political
motives run through every act of terrorism, even those that affect
primarily innocent civilians.
Therefore, for an act to be
considered terrorism under this new standard of political
terrorism, the act of terrorism must have a political motive, affect
a civilian population that is sufficiently broad, and transcend
national borders.
C.

Test of the PoliticalTerrorism Standard
The clarified standard of political terrorism will help to
prevent some local, specific crimes from being classified as acts of
terrorism, while still capturing those intended by the legislature.
Below are illustrations of the application of the political standard
of terrorism.

112 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(C) (2006). The definition of
terrorism in this Act is very similar to the New York antiterrorism statute. See id.
This provision provides that an act of terrorism must "appear to be intended[:] (i) to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government
by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping ... ." Id. § 2331(1)(B). The definition of
domestic terrorism is closer to what the New York legislature adopted, but this Note
suggests the adoption of a definition of international terrorism, even for local
terrorism acts. See id. § 2331(5).
113 See Gary LaFree & Laura Dugan, How Does Studying Terrorism Compare
to Studying Crime, in TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: CRIMINOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES, SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME, LAW AND DEVIANCE, supra note 111, at 59.
"' John Alan Cohan, Formulationof a State's Response to Terrorism and State-

Sponsored Terrorism, 14 PACE INT'L L. REV. 77, 84-85 (2002); see also HENDERSON,
supra note 111, at 4.
15 N.Y.S.,
N.Y.A., J. Res., 224th Sess. (2001), available at httpJ/news.
findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/nylegres9l3Ol.pdf.
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1.

A Member of Al Qaeda
A man is working for Al Qaeda, a group that is vocally antiAmerican and prone to violence. 16 An active member of the
group, this man agrees to aid in an attack on a subway in New
York City during rush hour in the morning. He places a bag in
the subway with a bomb, and it explodes after he retreats to
safety. The attack kills hundreds of people and causes extensive
damage to the subway system. Is the bomber a terrorist?
This act has political motives because of the desire to attack
and destroy American political, social, and economic ideals. The
actor achieved these goals by harming innocent civilians. The
target of this crime, New Yorkers who are commuting on the
subway, is a valid civilian population because it is large enough
and not too specific. This crime is international because the Al
Qaeda terrorist structure is international." 7 Al Qaeda has been
responsible for many attacks against the United States, here and
around the world, including on September 11.118 Given these
factors, this act would be considered a traditional act of terrorism
and would be considered terrorism under the political terrorism
standard.
School Shooter" 9
A high school student is continually bullied and wants
revenge on the students who have been tormenting him at school.
One day, he comes to school with a gun and opens fire on his
classmates, killing several and wounding others. Is the school
shooter a terrorist?
This crime does not have a political motive; the shooter was
motivated by a desire for revenge and does not have any deeper
political motives. While tragic, his crime only affected a small,
2.

116 Al Qaeda was established in Afghanisatan, by Osama bin Laden, a Saudi
Arabian millionaire, around 1990, with an anti-American platform. See HENDERSON,
supra note 111, at 50-51. For example, bin Laden regularly broadcasted his hatred
for America and its people, calling for Muslims to unite to kill U.S. citizens around
the world. See id. at 50.
117

See id.

118 The

U.S. government declared Al Qaeda, and specifically bin Laden, the
.prime suspect" for the attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, as
well as for attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania. See id.
119 See generally McIntyre, supra note 18 (examining the Ohio antiterrorism
statute and its application to a school shooter).
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localized group, not a civilian population.
The population
affected must be more than just a small, specific subsection of
society in order to be classified as terrorism under the political
terrorism standard. Finally, this would not be an international
crime because the student worked alone in a local manner.
Under the new clarified language of the political terrorism
standard, this school shooter would not be considered a terrorist.
The school shooter, however, could be considered a terrorist
under the current statutory definition if the court held that a
"civilian population" included the people present in the school
that day.
3.

The St. James Boys

Under the current statutory definition of terrorism, a Bronx
Court held that the St. James Boys were terrorists. 120 These
gang members, however, would not be considered terrorists
under the political terror standard.
First, the gang's acts are not politically motivated. While
gangs may attempt to control a particular community, the scope
of the gang members' crimes is small and tends to affect only a
partial subsection of society, not the community at large or the
government.
Also, gang members, along with other local
criminals, usually have selfish goals, such as the acquisition of
power or material goods; gang crimes do not have larger political
purposes.1 2 ' In contrast, terrorists tend to see themselves as
altruists, working for the greater good-a distinction often
separating terrorist activity from everyday local criminal
activity. 1 22 There must remain a difference between criminals
who, motivated by ego or other malignant personal desires,
"terrorize," and actual "terrorists."1 23
Intertwining the two
trivializes terrorism and leads to unconstitutional applications of
124
the statute.
Second, the St. James Boys did not target a civilian
population within the meaning of the statute. In the Morales

120 See generally Bronx District Attorney, October
121 See LaFree & Dugan, supra note 113, at 59.

31, 2007, supra note 1.

See id. at 59-60.
See Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Sniper Defendants: The Race To Prosecute
First, CNN, Nov. 1, 2002, http://edition.cnn.com/2002/LAW/11/01/findlaw.analysis.
allenbaugh.sniper/.
1'

12

" See id.
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case, the gang targeted only people of Mexican descent in a very
125
specific area of the West Bronx-north of Yankee Stadium.
This target is too small and too specific to be a "civilian
population" in the statutorily intended sense of the phrase, which
envisions a numerically larger interpretation of "civilian
population."'2 6 For example, if the St. James Boys had targeted
any and all civilians in the Bronx, this would more validly fit
within the definition of "civilian population."
Finally, the crimes of the St. James Boys did not "transcend
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they [were]
accomplished."1 27 Their crimes were local, affecting Mexicans in
their neighborhood only; they did not even venture to other parts
of the Bronx or New York City. Although many gang members
fled to Mexico, the flights were based on personal ties and did not
help with the actual commission of the street crimes. Therefore,
under the political terrorism standard, the St. James gang would
not be terrorists.

IV. GANGS OF NEW YORK:
No CURRENT EFFECTIVE STATUTORY SOLUTION
The solution to the increasing gang violence in New York is
to strengthen gang statutes, not increase the use of the statute.
Currently, New York does not have laws specifically designed to
effectively combat gang crimes. 28 For example, there are no
12' See Williams, New Terrorism Statute, supra note 9. Only those identifiable as
being of Mexican origin were targeted; everyone else was left alone. Id.
126 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.05 (McKinney 2010). In contrast to what this Note
contends, the Bronx District Attorney argued that because the St. James Boys
defined their targets so narrowly, the targets were definitely within the "civilian
population" statutory framework. See Resp't Br., supra note 39, at 11.
[Tihe proof established that the victims of the defendants' actions,
specifically and exclusively, were Mexicans or Mexican-Americans.
Moreover, it was not even the Mexican population of the entire state, city,
nor even the Mexican population of the entire Bronx; the defendants
restricted their victims to Mexicans who were within the geographic
limitations of that area of the Bronx which the defendant[s] attempted to
claim as their area of domain.
Id.
127 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(C) (2006).
128 In 2005, the Annual Report by the Commission of Investigation of the State
of New York contained a section on "Combating Gang Activity," describing the
need to clearly define terminology related to gangs, as well as create new gangspecific statutes in the New York Penal Code. See COMM'N OF INVESTIGATION OF

THE

STATE

OF

N.Y., ANNUAL

REPORT

2005,

at

7-8

(2005), available at

414
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sentence enhancement penalties for gang-related crimes in New
York that would allow a defendant who commits a crime as a
gang member to be sentenced more harshly than a nongang
member who commits a similar crime.'2 9 Moreover, the lack of
uniform laws in New York for gang crimes leads to unreliable
statistical information regarding gang-related crimes because the
crimes do not get recorded distinctly as "gang crimes." 13 0 This
creates misleading information about the frequency of gang
violence in New York. 13 ' Furthermore, the laws that prosecutors
use to punish gang members are not specific to gang violence,
and therefore, do not address specific issues relating to gangs,
such as solicitation or recruitment of gang members. Recently,
New York has seen an increase in violent street gangs of all
nationalities in all parts of the state, which validates the need for
32
gang-specific statutes.
A.

The Lack of Comprehensive Gang-Related Statutes in New
York
New York lacks comprehensive legislation addressing gangrelated activity. The New York Penal Law has only two statutes
addressing gang violence, and these deal only with gang
assault. 33 Additionally, the only definition of gang activity in

httpJ/www.worldcat.org/arcviewer/1/AO%23/2009/04/02/H1238693215513/viewer/file
37.pdf.
129 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (West 2010) (providing that when a
"pattern of criminal gang activity" has been proven, the defendant will be punished
for the underlying crime if it is enumerated in the statute subject to enhanced
sentencing).
"' See Memo on Bill A05637 (231st Sess.), available at httpJ/assembly.state.ny.
us/leg/?default fld=&bn=A05637&Memo=Y.
131 See id.
1
See id. As of 2007, there were approximately 15,000 gang members in New
York, with the number of Mexican gang members on the rise. See Brad Hamilton,
Gangs of New York-A Breakdown of Gotham's Most Nefarious Street Gangs and
Their Turfs, N.Y. POST, Oct. 28, 2007, at 22. Other gangs in New York, along with
their ethnic groups, include the Crips-mostly African-American; MS-13-mostly
Salvadoran, but also Honduran, Guatemalan, Ecuadorian, and Mexican; Vatos
Locos-Mexican; Latin Kings-mostly Puerto Rican, but includes Hispanics of all
kinds; the Bloods,-African-American; Netas-mostly Puerto Rican; Nifios MalosMexican; Dominicans Don't Play-Dominican; the Trinitarios,-mostly Dominican;
and the Flying Dragons,-Chinese. Id.
"3 See N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 120.06-.07 (McKinney 2010).
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New York law is found outside of the Penal Code, in an
administrative code-the New York Compilation of Codes, Rules
and Regulations."
The New York Penal Law contains gang assault provisions
in sections 120.07 and 120.06-gang assault in the first and
second degree, respectively. 3 5 Both statutes contain similar
language: The statutes provide that "A person is guilty of gang
assault.., when, with intent to cause physical injury to another
person and when aided by two or more other persons actually
present, he causes serious physical injury to such person or to a
third person." 136 While indirectly addressing gang activity, these

statutes do not use the terms "gang member" or "gang activity"
and, consequently, do not address gang violence directly. Rather,
these statutes are generally applicable to any group of people,
meaning more than one person, who collectively commit the
crime of assault.
These statutes do not adequately address gang violence.
First, the statutes do not define "gang" or "gang member," which
leads to uneven application by prosecutors against gang
members. Second, the prosecutor must prove that there was
serious physical injury to the victim and must prove that the
intent to commit serious physical injury was present, which
narrows the reach of the statute. 37 Third, because at least three
people must participate in the assault, the statute's applicability
is further narrowed. 38 Finally, because these statutes only deal
with assault, the New York Penal Code neglects to address many
other crimes-including violent felonies-that gang members
commit.
The Official Compilation of Codes, Rules & Regulations of
the State of New York contains definitions for some gang-related
terminology as part of its "Executive Department Title," in a
section regarding the use of state property. 139 This provision lists

'4

N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 9, ch. IV, § 301.3 (2010).

135N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.06-.07.
136Id. § 120.06 (emphasis added) (second

degree gang assault). To be guilty of
gang assault in the first degree, one must intend serious physical harm. Id. § 120.07.
137

See id. § 120.07.

See Bart H. Rubin, Note, Hail, Hail, The Gangs Are All Here: Why New York
Should Adopt a Comprehensive Anti-Gang Statute, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2033, 2043
(1998). "Insum, if only two actors commit gang assault, [or] if only physical injury is
caused,... the gang assault statute loses its bite." Id. at 2044.
13 N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 9, ch. IV, § 301.3.
13
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activities, including "gang activity," that are not allowed on state
property. 140 "Gang activity" is defined as "the commission by a
gang member, in a singular commission, attempt to commit,
conspiring to commit, or the solicitation of a criminal act, on
State property in the presence of two or more other gang
members.""' A "gang"is defined as "any ongoing organization,
association, or group of three or more persons.., having as one
of its primary activities the commission of one or more criminal
acts.., and whose members individually or collectively engage
in or have engaged in a pattern of gang activity.""4
The term
"gangmember" is defined as one "who is part of, associated with,
or otherwise affiliated with a gang. "143
Helpful as these
definitions may be, they exist solely in this administrative
document-referencing prohibited activity on state propertyand are not useful to a prosecutor charging a gang member with
a felony.
B.

Example of a Comprehensive Gang-Related Statute:
California

In contrast to New York, many states have statutes in their
criminal law codes that relate specifically to gang-related
activities and define key terms; 1" California is such a state.'4 5
California enacted the Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention Act of 1988 to deal with its extensive gang
population. 146 The definition for "participation in a criminal
street gang," one of the crimes created under this act, provides
that:

Id.
Id. § 301.3(d)(3).
142 Id. § 301.3(d)(1).
'4
Id. § 301.3(d)(2).
144 See NAT'L GANG CTR., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
140
141

PREVENTION, BRIEF REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE DEFINITIONS OF THE
TERMS "GANG," "GANG CRIME" AND "GANG MEMBER" 2 (2009), http'J/www.

nationalgangcenter.gov/Content/Documents/Definitions.pdf" Over thirty-five states
and Washington, D.C., excluding New York, have legislation in their criminal codes
that defines "gang." See id. at 10-21.
145 See id. at 11, 22-23. In Los Angeles alone, gang membership is estimated to
be at least 150,000--compared to 15,000 in New York City. See Hamilton, supra note
132, at 22.
14 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (2009).
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Any person who actively participates iii any criminal street
gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have
engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully
promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct
by members of that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in
a county jail for a period not to exceed one year, or by
imprisonment
in the state prison for 16 months, or two or three
7
years.

14

This California statute provides definitions for both "pattern
of criminal gang activity" and "criminal street gang. "148
Furthermore, there is a detailed sentencing enhancement scheme
for punishing defendants who satisfy each of the elements of this
crime and are convicted of participation in a criminal street gang,
potentially enhancing their sentences by an additional ten
years. 149 California, therefore, provides an example of a sentence
enhancing gang statute that is lacking in New York.
C. Non-Gang-Specific New York Statutes Used Against Gang
Members
Lacking comprehensive gang statutes, prosecutors in New
York have turned to other statutes that apply in an attempt to
punish gang-related activities adequately. Prosecutors in New
York have used several statutes against gang members for the
purpose of sentence enhancement by increasing the number of
crimes that are charged to a defendant for specific crimes.

"I Id. § 186.22(a).
,48 Id. § 186.22(e)-(f). The statute defines a "pattern of criminal gang activity" as
"the commission of, attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation
of, sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction of two or more of the following
offenses,... and the offenses were committed on separate occasions, or by two or
more persons." Id. § 186.22(e). These offenses are enumerated in the statute and
include, for example, assault with a deadly weapon. Id. The statute defines "criminal
street gang" as
any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons,
whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the
commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated[,] ... having a
common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members
individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of
criminal gang activity.
Id. § 186.22(f).
' See id. § 186.22(b)(1).
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For example, prosecutors can charge gang members with
"enterprise corruption," under section 460.20 of the New York
Penal Code. 1 0 A person is guilty of enterprise corruption when
having knowledge of the existence of a criminal enterprise and
the nature of its activities, and being employed by or associated
with such enterprise, he: (a) intentionally conducts or
participates in the affairs of an enterprise by participating in a
pattern of criminal activity; or (b) intentionally acquires or
maintains any interest in or control of an enterprise by
participating in a pattern of criminal activity; or (c) participates
in a pattern of criminal activity and knowingly invests any
proceeds derived from that conduct, or any proceeds derived
from the 5investment
or use of those proceeds, in an
1
enterprise.'
This statute focuses on organized criminal activity and can,
therefore, be applied to gang members who participate in drug
rings or prostitution rings.5 2 However, when applied to smaller,
less organized gangs striving to gain power and not money, the
enterprise corruption statute is not helpful because these gangs
do not form any type of enterprise that is punishable under this
statute.
Prosecutors can also charge gang members with
conspiracy. 153 A person is guilty of conspiracy when, "with intent
that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with
one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.20 (McKinney 2010). Enterprise corruption is a Class
B felony. Id. This is the state version of the federal racketeering act-the
Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). See William C.
Donnino, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Penal Law § 460.20, at 173 (McKinney 2008).
151N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.20(1). This statute gives specific guidelines for when a
defendant has participated in a pattern of criminal activity; it occurs
when, with intent to participate in or advance the affairs of the criminal
enterprise, [the defendant] engages in conduct constituting, or, is
criminally liable for pursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter, at least three
of the criminal acts included in the pattern, provided that: (a) [t]wo of his
acts are felonies other than conspiracy; (b) [tiwo of his acts, one of which is
a felony, occurred within five years of the commencement of the criminal
action; and (c) [e]ach of his acts occurred within three years of a prior act.
Id. § 460.20(1).
152 See Karen Freifeld, Alleged Drug Boss' Trial:Arguments Today in the Case of
the Rockaways 'Regulators', NEWSDAY, Jan. 10, 2000, at A17. The kingpin of the
Regulators, a violent gang in New York, was charged with enterprise corruption for
the gang's extensive drug activity. Id. It was estimated that the Regulators made
one million dollars per year in the 1990s selling cocaine. Id.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 105.00-.35.
150
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such conduct."" 4 Additionally, gang members can be charged
with accomplice liability, which relates to group gang-related
activity. 5 ' A person is criminally liable for the conduct of
another under this statute if, "acting with the mental culpability
required for the commission thereof, he solicits, requests,
intentionally aids [another] person to
commands, importunes, 1 or
56
conduct."
such
in
engage
These three statutes are examples of Penal Code provisions
that, when applied to gang members, increased the number of
crimes that a gang member can be charged with for the
commission of a single act. However, these statutes do not
escalate the sentence of one crime because they are actually
separate crimes, each imposing its own sentence.
Current Legislation in New York: PossibleStatutory
Solutions
Currently, there is a bill in the New York Assembly that
addresses gang-related crimes called the Criminal Street Gang
Abatement Act.' 57 This bill provides new and specific laws that
D.

Id. § 105.00. There are six degrees of the crime of conspiracy in New York
State, with conspiracy in the first degree as the most severe crime, which is
classified as an A-I felony. Id. § 105.17. This provides that conspiracy be committed
"with intent that conduct constituting a class A felony be performed, he, being over
eighteen years of age, agrees with one or more persons under sixteen years of age to
engage in or cause the performance of such conduct." Id.; see, e.g., People v. Faccio,
33 A.D.3d 1041, 822 N.Y.S.2d 329 (3d Dep't 2006). Here, the defendant, a gang
member, was convicted of conspiracy in the second degree because he had "intended"
a murder to happen-Class A felony crime-and had agreed with his co-defendants
to "engage in or cause the performance of" conduct constituting such felony,
although he did not actually commit the murder. Id. at 1042-44, 822 N.Y.S.2d at
330-32. Edgar Morales, the gang member charged as a terrorist under the New York
antiterrorism statute, was also charged with conspiracy in the second degree as a
predicate, specified offense. See Bronx District Attorney, October 31, 2007, supra
note 1.
"A

15 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 20.00-.25.
"5 Id.
§ 20.00. This is different from conspiracy because it involves an action on
the part of the defendant whether it be to solicit, request, command, importune, or
intentionally aid the other person in the commission of their crime. See Faccio, 33
A.D.3d at 1044, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 332 (explaining that the defendant's conduct in the
death of the victim was conspiracy but that there was not sufficient evidence of
accomplice liability).
157 The current version of this bill has yet to be passed by the New York
Legislature and was last revised on January 6, 2010. See N.Y.A. 5637, 231st Sess.
(2010), available at http'//assembly.state.ny.us/legbn=A05637. This law was
originally enacted in 2004 because of the increase in gang related slayings-up
eighty percent from 2002-2003 according to NYPD reports. See Press Release,
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It codifies the
adequately address gang-related crimes." 8
definitions of "criminal street gang," "pattern of street gang
activity," and "criminal act," and it also provides for enhanced
penalties for criminal acts committed by a criminal street gang. 159
This Act creates important crimes specifically related to
gang activity such as the crimes of gang solicitation, recruitment
or retention, 160 the crime of gang solicitation, recruitment or
retention of minors,'161 and the crime of gang solicitation,
recruitment or retention of minors on school grounds.162
Moreover, this Act appropriates funds for schools to initiate gang
prevention programs.' 6 3 This Act would also establish a gang
violence database and create witness protection programs.'6
Because of the elevated level of punishment and the sentence
enhancing provision, this Act has the potential to reduce and
deter gang violence and will ultimately be helpful in prosecuting
65
gang members in New York state. 1
The Bronx District Attorney would have been better served
by similar gang violence related statutes when prosecuting the
St. James Boys. Instead, the Bronx prosecutors were forced to
look outside of the box and creatively turned to the New York
antiterrorism statute to enhance the punishment of gang
members, fitting their crimes within the overly broad language of
the current statute.
This New York "urban terrorism"
interpretation of the New York antiterrorism statute, however,
leaves a troubling precedent-encouraging application of the
statute to completely unintended crimes. This underscores the
need to revise the statute to avoid additional unconstitutional
applications.
Senator Charles E. Schumer, New York, With Gang Killings Skyrocketing in NY,
Schumer and Long Island Gang-Slay Widow Unveil Tough New Tools To Fight
Gangs (Mar. 21, 2004), http://schumer.senate.gov/newwebsite/record-print.cfm?
id=265501. This law was also spurred by the increasing presence of gang violence in
the suburbs. See id. The legislation was also sponsored by Caryn Battaglia, whose
husband, Anthony Battaglia, was randomly targeted for robbery and killed by four
Latin King members while coming home from work in Long Island. See id.
I- See N.Y.A. 5637, 231st Sess. (2010), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us
/leg/?bn=A05637.
159 Id. § 2
160 Id. This crime would be a Class E felony. Id.
161 Id.
This crime would be a Class D felony. Id.
162 Id. This crime would be a Class C felony. Id.
16
16

Id. § 5.
Id. § 2.

1" See id.

2010]

GANGS OF NEW YORK

CONCLUSION
The New York antiterrorism statute is unconstitionally
vague and was unjustly applied against a Mexican gang member
in the Bronx. The legislative intent and history of the statute,
enacted in the aftermath of 9/11, illustrate that the true purpose
of the statute is to fight politically motivated terrorism attacks
against American ideals and freedoms. What emerged from the
rushed legislative process, however, was a statute that has little
more than symbolic power due to its latent ambiguities. The
statute should be modified to address only acts of political
terrorism. Such a clarification will ensure that the statute is
used for its intended purpose and not unconstitutionally applied
to local street crime, such as gang violence. In addition to
improving the statute, New York should focus on passing
detailed gang-related legislation, instead of allowing creative and
dangerously unconstitutional applications of this current overly
broad statute.
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